Abstract. The success of Conflict Driven Clause Learning (CDCL) for Boolean satisfiability has inspired adoption in other domains. We present a novel lifting of CDCL to program analysis called Abstract Conflict Driven Learning for Programs (ACDLP). ACDLP alternates between model search, which performs over-approximate deduction with constraint propagation, and conflict analysis, which performs under-approximate abduction with heuristic choice. We instantiate the model search and conflict analysis algorithms to an abstract domain of template polyhedra, strictly generalizing CDCL from the Boolean lattice to a richer lattice structure. Our template polyhedra can express intervals, octagons and restricted polyhedral constraints over program variables. We have implemented ACDLP for automatic bounded safety verification of C programs. We evaluate the performance of our analyser by comparing with CBMC, which uses CDCL, and Astrée, a commercial abstract interpretation tool. We observe two orders of magnitude reduction in the number of decisions, propagations, and conflicts as well as a 1.5x speedup in runtime compared to CBMC. Compared to Astrée, ACDLP solves twice as many benchmarks and has much higher precision. This is the first instantiation of CDCL with a template polyhedra abstract domain.
Introduction
Static program analysis with abstract interpretation [12] is widely used to verify properties of safety-critical systems. Static analyses commonly aim to compute program invariants as fixed-points of abstract transformers. Abstract states are chosen from a lattice that has meet (⊓) and join (⊔) operations; the meet precisely models set intersection (or conjunction, taking a logical view), and the join over-approximates set union (or disjunction). Over-approximation in the join operation is one of the sources of precision loss, which causes false alarms. Typical abstract domains are non-distributive; suppose a and b together represent the abstract semantics of a program and c represents a set of abstract behaviours that violate the specification. In a non-distributive domain, (a ⊔ b) ⊓ c can be strictly less precise than (a ⊓ c) ⊔ (b ⊓ c). This means that in typical abstract domains, analysing program behaviours separately can improve the precision of the analysis. Usual means to address false alarms therefore include not only the use of richer abstract domains, but also of refinements that delay joins or perform some form of case-splitting. Such techniques trade off higher precision against lower efficiency and may be susceptible to case enumeration behaviour.
By contrast, Model Checking (MC) [5] can be seen to operate on distributive lattice structures that represent disjunction without loss of precision. Classical MC directly operates on distributive representations, such as BDDs, while more recent implementations use SAT solvers. SAT solvers themselves operate on partial assignments, which are non-distributive structures. To handle disjunction, case-splitting is performed [16] . Propositional SAT solvers solve large formulae, and are often able to avoid enumerating cases. The impressive performance of modern solvers is credited to well-tuned decision heuristics and sophisticated clause learning algorithms. Collectively, these algorithms are referred to as Conflict Driven Clause Learning (CDCL) [6] . An obvious idea is to lift CDCL from the domain of partial assignments to other non-distributive domains.
Abstract Conflict Driven Clause Learning (ACDCL) [14] is one such latticebased generalization of CDCL. ACDCL is a general algorithmic framework, parameterized by a concrete domain C and an abstract domain A. Classical CDCL can be viewed as an instance of ACDCL in which C is the set of propositional truth assignments and A the domain of propositional partial assignments [18] . Since the concrete domain of interest is a parameter to the framework, ACDCL can in principle be used to build both logical decision procedures [8] and program analyzers. In the former case, the concrete domain is the set of candidate models for the formula; in the latter case, it is the set of program traces that may lead to an error. Haller et al. in [8] illustrate the first idea by presenting a floating-point decision procedure that uses interval constraint propagation.
In this paper, we explore the second idea by presenting an extension of ACDCL to program analysis. We call our framework Abstract Conflict Driven Learning for Programs (ACDLP). The key insight of ACDLP is to use decisions and learning to precisely reason about disjunctions in non-distributive domains, thereby automatically refining the precision of analysis for safety checking of C programs. We introduce two central components of our framework: an abstract model search algorithm that uses decisions and propagations to search for counterexample trace and an abstract conflict analysis procedure that approximates a set of unsafe traces through transformer learning. We illustrate the application of our framework to program analysis using a template polyhedra abstract domain [26] , which includes most of the commonly used abstract domains, such as boxes, octagons, zones and TCMs.
We present an experimental evaluation of our analyser compared to CBMC [10] , which uses propositional solvers, and to Astrée [7] , a commercial abstract interpretation tool. In this paper, we make the following contributions.
A novel program analysis framework that lifts model search and conflict
analysis procedures of CDCL algorithm over a template polyhedra abstract domain. These techniques are embodied in our tool, ACDLP, for automatic bounded safety verification of C programs. 2. A parameterized abstract transformer that guides the model search in forward, backward and multi-way direction for counterexample detection. 
Motivating Examples
In this section, we present two simple examples to demonstrate the core idea of ACDLP for bounded verification. For each example, we apply three analysis techniques: abstract interpretation (AI), SAT-based bounded model checking (BMC) and ACDLP. First Example The simple Control-Flow Graph (CFG) in Fig. 1 squares a machine integer and checks that the result is positive. To avoid overflow, we assume the input v has an upper bound N. This example demonstrates that a) interval analysis in ACDLP is more precise than a forward AI in the interval domain, and b) ACDLP with intervals can achieve a precision similar to that of AI with octagons without employing more sophisticated mechanisms such as trace partitioning [25] . AI versus ACDLP Conventional forward interval AI is too imprecise to verify safety of this program owing to the control-flow join at node n 4 . For example, the state-of-the-art AI tool Astrée requires external hints, provided by manually annotating the code with partition directives at n 1 . This tells Astrée to analyse the program paths separately. However, ACDLP can be understood as an algorithm to automatically infer such partitions. For the example in Fig. 1 , interval analysis with ACDLP is sufficient to prove safety. The analysis records the decisions and deductions in a trail data-structure. The trail can be viewed to represent a graph structure called the Abstract Conflict Graph (ACG) that stores dependencies between decisions and deductions nodes, similar to the way an Implication Graph [6] works in a SAT solver. Nodes of the ACG in the second column of Fig. 1 are labelled with the CFG location and the corresponding abstract value. Beginning with the assumption that v= [0, 5] at node n 1 , the intervals generated by forward analysis Reaching (Error: ⊥) is analogous to reaching a conflict in a propositional SAT solver. At this point, a clause-learning SAT solver learns a reason for the conflict and backtracks to a level such that the learnt clause is unit. By a similar process, ACDLP learns that c = [0, 0]. That is, all error traces must satisfy (c = 1). The analysis discards all interval constraints that lead to the conflict and backtracks to DL0. ACDLP then performs interval analysis with the learnt clause (c = 1). This also leads to a conflict, as shown in ACG3. The analysis cannot backtrack further and so terminates, proving the program safe. Thus, decision and clause learning are used to infer the partitions necessary for a precise analysis. Alternatively, the octagon analysis in ACDLP-illustrated in the third column of Fig. 1 Table 1 . SAT-based BMC versus ACDLP for verification of programs in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 Second Example Fig. 2 , demonstrates that octagon analysis in ACDLP is more precise than forward AI in the octagon domain. The CFG in Fig. 2 computes the absolute values of two variables, x and y, under the assumption (x = y) ∨ (x = −y). AI versus ACDLP Forward AI in the octagon domain infers the octagonal constraint Error: (p ≥ 0∧p+q ≥ 0∧q ≥ 0∧p+x ≥ 0∧p−x ≥ 0∧q+y ≥ 0∧q−y ≥ 0). Clearly this is too imprecise to prove safety. The octagonal analysis in ACDLP is illustrated by the ACGs in Fig. 2 . Due to space limitations, we elide intermediate deductions with dotted lines. The decision x = y at DL1 is not sufficient to prove safety, as shown in ACG1. Hence, a new decision x < 0 is made at DL2, followed by forward propagation that infers y < 0 at node n 5 . This subsequently leads to safety (Error: ⊥), as shown in ACG2. The analysis learns the reason for the conflict, discards all deductions in ACG2 and backtracks to DL1. Octagon analysis is run with the learnt constraint (x ≥ 0) and this infers y ≥ 0 at node n 5 , as shown in ACG3. This also leads to safety (Error: ⊥). The analysis now makes a new decision x = −y at DL1. The procedure is repeated leading to results shown in ACG4, ACG5, and ACG6. Clearly, the decisions x = −y and x < 0 also lead to safety. The analysis backtracks to DL0 and returns safe. Note that the specific decision heuristic we use in this case exploits the control structure of the program to infer partitions that are sufficient to prove safety.
ACDLP versus BMC ACDLP can require many fewer iterations than SATbased BMC due to its ability to reason over much richer lattice structures. A SATbased BMC converts the program into a bit-vector equation and passes that to a CDCL-based SAT solver for proving safety. 
Program Model and Abstract Domain

Program Representation
We consider bounded programs with safety properties given as a set of assertions, Assn, in the program. A bounded program is obtained by a transformation that unfolds loops and recursions a finite number of times. The result is represented by a set Σ = Prog ∪{¬ a∈Assn a}, where Prog contains an encoding of the statements in the program as constraints, obtained after translating the program into single static assignment (SSA) form via a data flow analysis. The representation Σ for the program in Fig. 1 is 
Abstract Domain
In this paper, we instantiate ACDLP over a reduced product domain [13] 
where B is the Boolean domain that permits abstract values {true, false, ⊥, ⊤} over boolean variables BVars in the program, and TP is a template polyhedra [26] domain over the numerical (bitvector) variables NVars. Our template polyhedra domain can express various relational and non-relational templates over NVars, as given in Table 2 .
Template Polyhedra Abstract Domain An abstract value of the template polyhedra domain [26] represents a set X of values of the vector x of numerical (bitvector) variables NVars of their respective data types. (Currently, signed and unsigned integers are supported.) For example, in the program given by Eq. (1), we have four numerical variables, written as the vector x = (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , z). An abstract value is a constant vector d that represents sets of values for x for which Cx ≤ d, for a fixed coefficient matrix C. The domain containing d is augmented by a special element ⊥ to denote the minimal element of the lattice. There are several optimisation-based techniques [26] for computing the domain operations, such as meet (⊓) and join (⊔), in the template polyhedra domain. In our implementation, we use the strategy iteration approach of [9] . The abstraction function is defined by α(X ) = min{d | Cx ≤ d, x ∈ X }, where min is applied component-wise. The concretisation γ(d) is the set {x | Cx ≤ d} and γ(⊥) = ∅, i.e., the empty polyhedron.
For notational convenience we will use conjunctions of linear inequalities, for , we have at most 2N 2 inequalities, one for the upper and lower bounds of each variable and sums and differences for each pair of variables. Unlike a non-relational domain, a relational domain such as octagons requires the computation of a closure in order to obtain a normal form, necessary for precise domain operation. The closure computes all implied domain constraints. An example of a closure computation for octagonal inequalities is
For octagons, closure is the most critical and expensive operator; it has cubic complexity in the number of program variables. We therefore compute closure lazily in template polyhedra domain in our abstract model search procedure, which is described in section 5.3.
Abstract Transformers An abstract transformer σ D transforms an abstract value a through a constraint σ; it deduces information from a and σ. The best transformer is
where we write u |= σ if the concrete value u satisfies the constraint σ. Any abstract transformer that over-approximates the best abstract transformer is a sound transformer and can be used in our algorithm. For example, we can deduce
We denote the set of abstract transformers for a safety formula ϕ using the abstract domain
Properties of Abstract Domains
An important property of a clause-learning SAT solver is that each non-singleton element of the partial assignment domain can be decomposed into a set of precisely complementable singleton elements [14] . This property of domain elements is necessary to learn elements that help to guide the model search away from the conflicting region of the search space. Most numerical abstract domains, such as intervals and octagons lack complements in general, i.e., not every element in the domain has a precise complement. However, these domain elements can be represented as intersections of half-spaces, each of which admits a precise complement. We formalise this in the sequel.
Definition 1. A meet irreducible m in a complete lattice structure A is an element with the following property.
The meet irreducibles in the Boolean domain B for a variable x are x and ¬x. The meet irreducibles in the template polyhedra domain are all elements that concretise to half-spaces, i.e., they can be represented by a single inequality. For the interval domain, these are
For polyhedra this intuitively means that each polyhedron can be written as an intersection of half-spaces. For example, the meet decomposition of the interval domain element decomp(2 ≤ x ≤ 4 ∧ 3 ≤ y ≤ 5) is the set {x ≥ 2, x ≤ 4, y ≥ 3, y ≤ 5}.
Definition 3. An element a ∈ D is called precisely complementable iff there existsā ∈ D such that ¬γ(ā) = γ(a). That is, there is an element whose complemented concretisation equals the concretisation of a.
The precise complementation property of a partial assignment lattice can be generalised to other lattice structures. For example, the precise complement of a meet irreducible (x ≤ 2) in the interval domain over integers is (x ≥ 3), or the precise complement of the meet irreducible (x + y ≤ 1) in the octagon domain over integers is (x+y ≥ 2). Our domain implementation supports precise complementation operation. However, standard abstract interpretation does not require a complementation operator. Hence, abstract domain libraries, such as APRON [20] , do not provide it. But it can be implemented with the help of a meet decomposition as explained above.
Abstract Conflict Driven Learning for Programs
Learn new transformer Partial Safety Proof 
while result = conflict 14 end counterexample trace, and the program is unsafe. Else, if a conflict is encountered, then it implies that the corresponding program trace is either not valid or safe. ACDLP then moves to the conflict analysis phase where it learns the reason for the conflict from partial safety proof using an abstract abductive transformer, abd, followed by a heuristic choice of conflict reason. Similar to a SAT solver, ACDLP picks one conflict reason from multiple incomparable reasons for conflict for efficiency reasons. Hence, it operates over an under-approximate domain of conflict reasons. A conflict reason under-approximates a set of invalid or safe traces. The conflict analysis returns a learnt transformer (negation of conflict reason) that over-approximates a set of valid and unsafe traces. Model search is repeated with this new transformer. Else, if no further backtracking is possible, then ACDLP terminates and returns safe. We present the ACDLP algorithm in subsequent section.
The input to ACDLP (Algorithm 1) is a program in the form of a set of abstract transformers A = { σ D |σ ∈ Σ} w.r.t. an abstract domain D . Recall that the safety formula σ∈Σ σ is unsatisfiable if and only if the program is safe. The algorithm is parametrised by heuristics for propagation (H P ), decisions (H D ), and conflict analysis (H C ). The algorithm maintains a propagation trail T and a reason trail R. The propagation trail stores all meet irreducibles inferred by the abstract model search phase (deductions and decisions). The reason trail maps the elements of the propagation trail to the transformers ded ∈ A that were used to derive them.
Definition 4.
The abstract value abs(T) corresponding to the propagation trail T is the conjunction of the meet irreducibles on the trail: abs(T) = m∈T m with abs(T) = ⊤ if T is the empty sequence.
The algorithm begins with an empty T, an empty R, and the abstract value ⊤. The procedure deduce (details in Section 5) computes a greatest fixed-point over the transformers in A that refines the abstract value, similar to the Boolean Algorithm 2: Abstract Model Search deduce HP (A, T, R) input : A program in the form of a set of abstract transformers A, a propagation trail T, and a reason trail R. output : sat or conflict or unknown
Constraint Propagation step in SAT solvers. If the result of deduce is conflict (⊥), the algorithm terminates with safe. Otherwise, the analysis enters into the while loop at line 4 and makes a new decision by a call to decide (see Section 5.4), which returns a new meet irreducible q. We concatenate q to the trail T. The decision q refines the current abstract value abs(T) represented by the trail, i.e., abs(T · q) ⊑ abs(T). For example, a decision in the interval domain restricts the range of intervals for variables. We set the corresponding entry in the reason trail R to ⊤ to mark it as a decision. Here, the index of R is the size of trail T, denoted by |T|. The procedure deduce is called next to infer new meet irreducibles based on the current decision. The model search phase alternates between the decision and deduction until deduce returns either sat or conflict.
If deduce returns sat, then we have found an abstract value that represents models of the safety formula, which are counterexamples to the required safety property, and so ACDLP returns unsafe. If deduce returns conflict, the algorithm enters in the analyzeConflict phase (see Section 6) to learn the reason for the conflict. There can be multiple incomparable reasons for conflict. ACDLP heuristically chooses one reason C and learns it by adding it as an abstract transformer to A. The analysis backtracks by removing the content of T up to a point where it does not conflict with C . ACDLP then performs deductions with the learnt transformer. If analyzeConflict returns false, then no further backtracking is possible. Thus, the safety formula is unsatisfiable and ACDLP returns safe.
Abstract Model Search for Template Polyhedra
Model search in a SAT solver has two steps: deductions, which are repeated application of the unit rule (also called Boolean Constraint Propagation, or BCP), to refine current partial assignments, and decisions to heuristically guess a value for an unassigned literal. BCP can be seen to compute greatest fixed point over the partial assignment domain [14] . Below, we present an abstract model search procedure that computes a greatest fixed point over abstract transformers σ D .
Parametrised Abstract Transformers
The key considerations for an abstract transformer are precision and efficiency. A precise transformer is usually less efficient than a more imprecise one. In this paper, we present a specialised variant of the abstract transformer to compute deductions called Abstract Deduction Transformer (ADT), which is parametrised by a given subdomain L ⊆ D . A subdomain contains a chosen subset of the elements in D including ⊥ and ⊤ that forms a lattice. The use of a subdomain serves two purposes -a) It allows us elegantly and flexibly to guide the deductions in forward, backward or multi-way direction, which in turn affects the analysis precision, and b) It makes deductions more efficient, for example by performing lazy closure in template polyhedra domain. For space reasons, we refer the reader to Appendix D for details of the lazy closure operation.
An ADT is defined formally as follows.
For L = D , the ADT is identical to the abstract transformer defined in Eq. (2) in Section 3. Note that a restricted subdomain makes a transformer less precise but more efficient. Conversely, an unrestricted subdomain make a transformer more precise, but less efficient. Therefore, we have the property σ Itvs [{c,x,y}] = a ⊓ (y ≤ 6 ∧ y ≥ 6). This performs an lhs-to-rhs propagation for c = (x = y) and rhs to lhs propagation for y = y + 1 and hence emulates a multi-way analysis.
Algorithm for the Deduction Phase
Algorithm 2 presents the deduction phase deduce in our abstract model search procedure. The input to deduce is the set of abstract transformers, a propagation trail (T) and a reason trail (R). Additionally, the procedure deduce is parametrised by a propagation heuristic (H P ). We write the ADT σ If ded L deduces ⊥, then the procedure deduce returns conflict (shown in line 8). Otherwise, when a fixed-point is reached, i.e. the worklist is empty, we check whether the abstract transformers A are γ-complete [14] for the current abstract value abs(T) (shown in line 15). Intuitively, this checks whether all concrete values in γ(abs(T)) satisfy the safety formula ϕ, where ϕ := σ∈Σ σ is obtained from the program transformation (as defined in Section 3.1). If it is indeed γ-complete, then deduce returns sat. Otherwise, the algorithm returns unknown and ACDLP makes a new decision.
Computing Lazy Closure for Template Polyhedra
An advantage of our formalism in Eq. (4) is that the closure operation for relational domains can be computed in a lazy manner through the construction of a subdomain, L. The construction of L allows us to perform one step of the closure operation when ded L is applied. For example, let us consider D = Octs[{x, y, z}] and V = {y}. An octagonal inequality relates at most two variables. Thus it is sufficient to consider the subdomain MakeL D ({y}) = Octs[{y}]∪Octs[{x, y}]∪Octs[{y, z}], which will compute the one-step transitive relations of y with each of the other variables. Only if any subsequent abstract deduction transformer makes new deductions on x or z, then the next step of the closure will be computed through the subdomain Octs[{x, z}]. Hence, an application of each abstract deduction transformer does not compute the full closure in the full domain, but compute only a single step of the closure in a subdomain. This makes each deduction step more efficient but may require more steps to reach the fixed point.
Decisions
A decision q is a meet irreducible that refines the current abstract value abs(T), when the result of fixed-point computation through deduction is neither a conflict nor a satisfiable model of ϕ. A decision must always be consistent with respect to the trail T, i.e., abs(T ·q) = ⊥. A new decision increases the decision level by one. Given the current abstract value abs(T), the procedure decide in Algorithm 1 heuristically returns a meet irreducible.
For example, a decision in the interval domain can be of the form xRd where R ∈ {≤, ≥}, and d is the bound. A decision in the octagon domain can specify relations between variables, and can be of the form ax − by ≤ d, where x and y are variables, a, b ∈ {−1, 0, 1} are coefficients, and d is a constant. We refer the reader to Appendix B for the details of different decision heuristics in ACDLP.
Abstract Conflict Analysis for Template Polyhedra
Propositional conflict analysis with FIRST-UIP [6] can be seen as abductive reasoning that under-approximates a set of models that do not satisfy a formula [14, 16] . Below, we present an abstract conflict analysis procedure, analyzeConflict of Algorithm 1, that uses a domain-specific abductive transformer for effective learning. A conflict analysis procedure involves two steps: abduction and heuristic choice for generalisation. Abduction infers possible generalised reasons for a conflict which is followed by heuristically selecting a generalisation. Below, we define a global conflict transformer that gives a set of models that do not satisfy a formula. computes the most general set of incomparable reasons under which ϕ implies the truth of a (or ⊥ since f ormula is unsatisfiable under a). Now, an abstract abductive transformer for ϕ = {x = y + 1 && x ≥ 0} is given by, abd The main idea of abductive reasoning is to iteratively replace a singleton assignment s in the conflict reason by a partial assignment that is sufficient to infer s. Conflict abduction is performed by obtaining cuts through markings in the trail T, by the application of abstract Unique Implication Point (UIP) search algorithm [6] . Every cut is a reason for conflict. The UIP search can also be understood through graph cutting in an Abstract Conflict Graph, which is defined next. cut 1 (last UIP) Fig. 4 . Finding the Abstract UIP in the Octagon Domain Definition 6. An Abstract Conflict Graph (ACG) is a directed acyclic graph in which the vertices are defined by all deduced elements or a decision node and a special conflict node (⊥) in the trail T. The edges in ACG are obtained from the reason trail R that maps the elements in T to the abstract transformers that are used to derive the deduced elements.
Abstract UIP Search An abstract UIP algorithm [8] traverses the trail T starting from the conflict node and computes a cut that suffices to produce a conflict. For example, consider a formula ϕ := {x+4=z ∧ x+z=2y ∧ z+y > 10}. As before, the trail can be viewed to represent an ACG, shown in Fig. 4 , that records the sequence of deductions in the octagon domain that are inferred from a decision (x≤0) for the formula ϕ. The arrows (in red) shows the relationship between the reason trail and propagation trail in bottom of Fig. 4 . For the partial abstract value, a = {x ≤ 0 ∧ x + z ≤ 4 ∧ z ≤ 4}, obtained from the trail, the result of the abstract deduction transformer is y = (x + z)/2 Octs (a) = {x + y ≤ 2, y ≤ 2, y + z ≤ 6}. A conflict (⊥) is reached for the decision x≤0. Note that there exist multiple incomparable reasons for conflict, marked as cut0 and cut1 in Fig. 4 . Here, cut0 is the first UIP (node closest to conflict node). Choosing cut0 yields a learnt clause (y + z > 6), which is obtained by negating the reason for conflict. The abstract UIP algorithm returns a learnt transformer AUnit, which is described next.
Learning in Template Polyhedra Domain Learning in a propositional solvers yields an asserting clause [6] that expresses the negation of the conflict reasons. We present a lattice-theoretic generalisation of the unit rule for template-based abstract domains that learns a new transformer called abstract unit transformer (AUnit ). We add AUnit to the set of abstract transformers A. AUnit is a generalisation of the propositional unit rule to numerical domains. For an abstract lattice D with complementable meet irreducibles and a set of meet irreducibles C ⊆ D such that C does not satisfy ϕ, AUnit C : D → D is formally defined as follows.
Rule (1) shows AUnit returns ⊥ since a ⊑ C is conflicting. Rule (2) of AUnit infer a valid meet irreducible, which implies that C is unit. Rule (3) of AUnit returns ⊤ which implies that the learnt clause is not asserting after backtracking. This would prevent any new deductions from the learnt clause. Progress is then made by decisions. An example of AUnit for C = {x ≥ 2, x ≤ 5, y ≤ 7} is given below.
Backjumping A backjumping procedure removes all the meet irreducibles from the trail up to a decision level that restores the analysis to a non-conflicting state. The backjumping level is defined by the meet irreducibles of the conflict clause that is closest to the root (decision level 0) where the conflict clause is still unit. If a conflict clause is globally unit, then the backjumping level is the root of the search tree and analyzeConflict returns false, otherwise it returns true.
Experimental Results
We have implemented ACDLP for bounded safety verification of C programs. ACDLP is implemented in C++ on top of the CPROVER [4] framework and consists of around 9 KLOC. The template polyhedra domain is implemented in C++ in 10 KLOC. Templates can be intervals, octagons, zones, equalities, or restricted polyhedra. Our domain handles all C operators, including bitwise ones, and supports precise complementation of meet irreducibles, which is necessary for conflict-driven learning. Our tool and benchmarks are available at http://www.cprover.org/acdcl/.
We verified a total of 85 ANSI-C benchmarks. These are derived from: (1) the bit-vector regression category in SV-COMP'16; (2) ANSI-C models of hardware circuits auto-generated by v2c [24] from VIS Verilog models and opencores.org; (3) controller code with varying loop bounds auto-generated from Simulink model and control intensive programs with nested loops containing relational properties. All the programs with bounded loops are completely unrolled before analysis.
We compare ACDLP with the state-of-the-art SAT-based bounded model checker CBMC ([2], version 5.5) and a commercial static analysis tool, Astrée ([3], version 14.10). CBMC uses MiniSAT 2.2.1 in the backend. Astrée uses a range of abstract domains, which includes interval, bit-field, congruence, trace partitioning, and relational domains (octagons, polyhedra, zones, equalities, filter). To enable fair comparison using Astrée, all bounded loops in the program are completely unwound up to a given bound before passing to Astrée. This prevents Astrée from widening loops. ACDLP is instantiated to a product of the Booleans and the interval or octagon domain instance of template polyhedra. ACDLP is also configured with a decision heuristic (ordered, random, activitybased), propagation (forward, backward and multi-way), and conflict-analysis (learning UIP, DPLL-style). The timeout for our experiments is set to 200 seconds. ACDLP versus CBMC Fig. 5 presents a comparison of the analyses using CBMC and ACDLP. Fig. 5(a) clearly shows that the SAT based analysis made significantly more decisions compared to ACDLP for all the benchmarks. The points on the extreme right below the diagonal in Fig. 5(b) show that the number of propagations in the SAT based analysis is maximal for benchmarks that exhibit relational behaviour. These benchmarks are solved by octagon domain in ACDLP. We see a reduction of at least two orders of magnitude in the total number of decisions, propagations and conflicts compared to analysis using CBMC. Out of 85 benchmarks, SAT based analysis could prove only 26 benchmarks without any restarts. The solver was restarted in the other 59 cases to avoid spending too much time in "hopeless" branches. By contrast, ACDLP solved all 85 benchmarks without restarts. The runtime comparison between ACDLP and CBMC are shown in Figure 6 . ACDLP is 1.5X faster than CBMC. The superior performance of ACDLP is attributed to the decision heuristics, which exploit the high-level structure of the program, combined with the precise deduction by multi-way transformer and stronger learnt clause aided by the richer abstract domains. ACDLP versus Astrée To enable precise analysis using Astrée, we manually instrument the benchmarks with partition directives ASTREE partition control at various control-flow joins. These directives provide external hint to Astrée to guide its internal trace partition domain. Figure 6 demonstrates that Astrée is 2X faster than ACDLP for 37% cases (32 out of 85); but the analysis using Astrée shows a high degree of imprecision (marked as timeout in Figure 6 ). Astrée reported 53 false alarms among 85 benchmarks. Whereas, the analysis using ACDLP produces correct results for 81 benchmarks. ACDLP timed out for 4 benchmarks. Clearly, ACDLP has higher precision than Astrée. Detailed analysis of the comparison between ACDLP, CBMC and Astrée is presented in Appendix A.
Our experimental evaluation suggests that ACDLP can be seen as a technique to improve the efficiency of SAT-based BMC. Additionally, ACDLP can also be perceived as an automatic way to improve the precision of conventional abstract interpretation over non-distributive lattices through automatic partition generation techniques such as decisions and transformer learning.
Related Work
The work of [17] presents a tight integration of SAT solving with interval based arithmetic constraint solving to handle large constraint systems. Silva et al. [16] present an abstract interpretation account of satisfiability algorithms derived from DPLL procedures. The work of [15] is a very early instantiation of abstract CDCL [16] as an interval-based decision procedure for programs, but in a purely logical settings. A similar technique that lifts DPLL(T) to programs is Satisfiability Modulo Path Programs (SMPP) [19] . SMPP enumerates program paths using a SAT formula, which are then verified using abstract interpretation. The work of [22] proposes an algorithm inspired by constraint solvers for inferring disjunctive invariants using intervals. The lifting of CDCL to first-order theories is proposed in [11, 21, 23] . Unlike previous work that operates on a fixed first-order lattice, ACDLP can be instantiated with different abstract domains as well as product domains.
ACDLP is not, however, similar to abstraction refinement. ACDLP works on a fixed abstraction. Also, transformer learning in ACDLP does not soundly overapproximate the existing program transformers. Hence, transformer learning in ACDLP is distinct from transformer refinement in classical CEGAR.
Conclusions
In this paper, we present a general algorithmic framework for lifting the model search and conflict analysis procedures in satisfiability solvers to program analysis. We embody these techniques in a tool, ACDLP, for automatic bounded safety verification of C programs over a template polyhedra abstract domains.
We present an abstract model search procedure that uses a parameterised abstract transformer to flexibly control the precision and efficiency of the deductions in the template polyhedra abstract domain. The underlying expressivity of the abstract domain helps our decision heuristics to exploit the high-level structure of the program for making effective decisions. The abstract conflict analysis procedure learns abstract transformers over a given template following a UIP computation. Experimental evaluation over a range of benchmarks shows 20x reduction in the total number of decisions, propagations, conflicts and backtracking iterations compared to CBMC. Moreover, ACDLP is 1.5x faster than CBMC. Compared to Astrée, ACDLP solves twice as many benchmarks and has much higher precision. In the future, we plan to extend our framework to unbounded verification through invariant generation. Table 3 gives a detailed comparison between CBMC version 5.5 and ACDLP. Columns 1-4 in Table 3 contain the name of the tool, the benchmark category, the number of lines of code (LOC), and the total number of safe and unsafe benchmarks in the respective categories (labelled as Safe/Unsafe). The solver statistics (Decisions, Propagations, Conflicts, Conflict Literals, Restarts) for CBMC and ACDLP are in columns 5-9.
We classify our benchmarks into separate categories. We label the benchmarks in bit-vector regression category from SV-COMP'16 as Bit-vector, ANSI-C models of hardware circuits auto-generated by v2c tool as Verilog-C and auto-generated Controller code and control-intensive benchmarks as ControlFlow category. The total number of benchmarks in bit-vector category are 13, Control-Flow category contains 55 benchmarks and Verilog-C category has 17 benchmarks. The timeout for our experiments is set to 200 seconds. All times in Table 3 and Table 4 are in seconds.
The Bit-vector category contains a total of 13 benchmarks, out of which 6 are safe and the remaining 7 are unsafe benchmarks. The benchmarks in the controlflow category contains simple bounded loop analysis with relational properties to more complex controller code containing nested loops with varying loop bounds. Out of 55 benchmarks in this category, 35 are safe and 20 are unsafe. We verified a total of 17 hardware benchmarks, which are given in Verilog RTL language. Out of these 17 benchmarks, 10 are safe and the remaining 7 are unsafe. The software models (in ANSI-C) for the Verilog circuits are obtained via a Verilog to C translator tool, v2c. These software models are then fed to CBMC and ACDLP. The hardware benchmarks include an implementation of a Instruction buffer logic, FIFO arbiter, traffic light controller, cache coherence protocol, Dekker's mutual exclusion algorithm among others. The largest benchmark is the cache coherence protocol which consists of 890 LOC and the smallest benchmark is TicTacToe with 67 LOC. The software models of these Verilog circuits uses several complex bit-wise logic to map hardware operations into an equivalent C syntax. We emphasize that our implementation can handle bit-wise operations out-of-the-box. The statistics for ACDLP in Table 3 is obtained using an ordered decision heuristic, multi-way propagation heuristic and a first-UIP learning heuristic. Note that the deductions using a multi-way heuristic is more precise than forward or backward heuristics, but multi-way heuristic takes longer time to reach the fixed-point. Furthermore, multi-way heuristic significantly reduces the total number of decisions, propagations and learning iterations due to higher precision of the deductions made in the abstract domain. Overall, ACDLP reduces the total number of decisions, propagations, conflicts and restarts by a factor of 20X compared to CBMC. Table 4 gives a detailed comparison between Astrée and ACDLP. Columns 1-5 in Table 4 gives the name of the tool, the benchmark category, the total number of instances proved safe or unsafe (labelled as safe/unsafe), the total number of inconclusive benchmarks and total number of false positives per category. Table 4 shows that ACDLP solved twice more benchmarks than Astrée. The total number of inconclusive results in ACDLP is 4. The inconclusive results is because of timeout. By contrast, Astrée reports a total of 53 false positives among 85 benchmarks. Clearly, ACDLP is more precise than Astrée.
B Decision Heuristics in ACDLP
We have implemented several decision heuristics in ACDLP: ordered, longestrange, random, and the activity based decision heuristic. The ordered decision heuristic makes decisions on meet irreducibles that involve conditional variables (variables that appear in conditional branches) first before choosing meet irreducibles with numerical variables. The longest-range heuristic simply keeps track of the bounds d l , d u of matching template rows, which are row vectors c, c 2 ⌋ or its complement. This ensures a fairness policy in selecting a variable since it guarantees that the intervals of meet irreducibles are uniformly restricted. The random decision heuristic arbitrarily picks a meet irreducible for making decision. The activity based decision heuristic is inspired by the decision heuristic used in the Berkmin SAT solver. The activity based heuristic keeps track of the activity of meet irreducibles that participate in conflict clauses. Based on the most active meet irreducible, ranges are split similar to the longest-range heuristic. Fig. 7 (a) presents a comparison between the forward and multi-way propagation strategy in ACDLP. The choice of strategy influences the total number of decisions and clause learning iterations. Hence, the propagation strategy has a significant influence on the runtime, which can be seen in Fig. 7(a) . We did not report the performance of backward propagation strategy due to large number of timeouts. Compared to forward propagation, the multi-way strategy may take more iterations to reach the fixed-point, but it subsequently reduces the total number of decisions and conflicts to prove the program. This is attributed to the higher precision of the meet irreducibles inferred by the multi-way strategy, which subsequently aids the decision heuristics to make better decisions.
Decision Heuristics. Fig. 7(b) shows the performance of different decision heuristics in ACDLP. Note that the runtimes for all decision heuristics are obtained using the multi-way propagation strategy. The runtimes are very close, but we can still discern some key characteristics of these heuristics. The activity based heuristic performs consistently well for most safe benchmarks and all bit-vector category benchmarks. By contrast, the ordered heuristic performs better for programs with conditional branches since it prioritises decisions on meet irreducibles that appear in conditionals. The runtimes for the random heuristic are marginally higher than the other two. This suggests that domain-specific decision heuristics are important for ACDLP.
Learning. Learning has a significant influence on the runtime of ACDLP. We compare the UIP-based learning technique with an analysis that performs classical DPLL-style analysis. The effect of UIP computation allows ACDLP to backtrack non-chronologically and guide the model search with a learnt transformer. But classical DPLL-style analysis exhibits case-enumeration behaviour and could not finish within the time bound for 20% of our benchmarks.
D Computing Lazy Closure for Template Polyhedra
Computing the closure for relational domains, such as octagons, is expensive. An advantage of our formalism in Eq. (4) Recall that a closure in octagon domain achieves a normal form by computing all implied constraints among numerical variables. The closure operation is necessary to perform precise domain operations. The ACDLP analysis in Figure 8 performs forward propagation in Octs by creating a subdomain L for every transformer using the function MakeL. Note that the choice of subdomain over lhs variables of the transformers guides the analysis in forward direction in this example. The subdomain corresponding to L1 over y is given by Octs[{y}] ∪ Octs[{y, z}]. This means, only those deductions which are implied by the domain Octs[{y}] ∪ Octs[{y, z}] can be inferred at L1. No deductions over Octs[{y, x}] is performed at L1. Thus, we delay the deductions over {y, x} until we encounter an abstract transformer over these variables. This does not admit a normal form for octagonal constraints after the application of the transformer at L1, but it makes the deduction step at L1 more efficient.
Assume that the initial abstract value (a) is a = (x = y). Then, the deduction at L1 infers y = z. Thus, the updated abstract value is a = {x = y ∧ y = z}. We now analyze the transformer at L2. The subdomain for L2 over variable x (for forward propagation) is given by Octs[{x}] ∪ Octs[{x, y}] ∪ Octs[{x, z}] ∪ Octs [{x, w}] . Note that we delayed the deduction over Octs[{x, y}] at L1, but only perform the deductions over Octs[{x, y}] at L2. This is the notion of lazy closure computation. The new deductions at L2 are {x = z, x−w ≤ 1, x−w ≥ 1} and the final abstract value is a = {x = y ∧y = z ∧x = z ∧x−w ≤ 1∧x−w ≥ 1}. Thus, the normal form over Octs{x, y, z} is only achieved at L2. However, we do not perform deductions over Octs{w, z} at L2, which is delayed until the point where we encounter an abstract transformer that forces us to infer such deductions. 
E Example Demonstrating Execution of ACDLP
We now present a step-by-step execution of the ACDLP algorithm. Figure 9 shows a Control-flow Graph of a program. The program is safe since the Error location is unreachable along every execution of program paths. We analyze the safety of this program using ACDLP. Fig. 10 shows an example run for the coun- terexample search procedure for the program in Fig.9 . The elements obtained using an overapproximate strongest postcondition transformer apost are marked in blue in Fig. 10 . Starting from ⊤, forward analysis concludes that x is between -2 and 2 from apost y:=−2 ∪ apost y=0 ∪ aposty := 2. Note that the loop is completely unwound and all statements corresponding to the loop are collectively referred to as loop. A forward fixed-point analysis (marked by apost loop ) does not yield any new information. Clearly, the analysis is not precise to infer anything about the reachability of the error location Error. Hence, we apply a decision by picking a meet irreducible y ≥ 2 to increase the precision of analysis. We then apply forward analysis from this decision which yields a downward iteration sequence as shown in lower part of Fig. 10 . Forward analysis concludes that {y ≥ 4}. This leads to conflict, marked as ⊥. Hence, the error location Error is unreachable for this decision. The conflict analysis procedure is shown in Figure 11 . We iteratively apply the weakest precondition transformer apre starting from the conflict element (⊥), the result of which is shown in bold text. For example, apre y≤0 (⊥) = {y > 0}; whereas the result of strongest postcondition is is {y ≥ 4}. So, we heuristically pick a generalized element a such that {y ≥ 4} ⊑ a ⊑ {y > 0}; we pick c = {y > 0} through the application of heuristic choice [18] (corresponds to upwards interpolation), int ↾ (y > 0, y ≥ 4), marked in blue. Note that the loop is completely unwound and all statements corresponding to the loop are collectively referred to as loop. We then repeat the process marked by apre loop . Subsequently, we derive a generalized reason, {x > 0, y > 0}, that strictly generalizes the decision x >= 2. The conflict reason {x > 0, y > 0} underapproximates set of safe traces. Fig. 12 shows the sequence of fixed point iteration with the learned transformer y ≤ 0 {x ≥ −2, x ≤ 0} {y ≥ 0} {y ≥ 0} ⊥ apost x:=−2 ∪ apost x:=0 apost y=x * y apost loop apost y<0 Fig. 12 . Downward Iteration Sequence with Learned transformer y ≤ 0, obtained from AU nit. Clearly, this also leads to conflict. There are no further cases to explore. Thus, the procedure terminates and returns safe.
